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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDALYN ENCE, nka : 
WENDALYN SMITH, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. : 
LARRY D. ENCE, : 
Respondent/Appelldfi*. 
CASE NO. 981707 -
: PRIORITY NO. 15 
- CA 
Appellee, LARRY ENCE, hereinafter "Husband" or 
"Respondent", submits the following Brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
Rules 3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and to 
§78-2a-3(2) (h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's award of alimony for 21 
years was within its broad discretion where the trial court 
specifically addressed the needs and standard of living of 
the Husband, the Husband's earning ability, and the Wife's 
ability to provide support? 
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has 
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broad discretion, and its decisions will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992) (citing 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court's award of alimony was 
within its broad discretion as a compensating award of 
alimony? 
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has 
broad discretion, and its decisions will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appellant submits that there are no statutory or 
constitutional provisions determinative of the issues 
presented herein. However §30-3-5 UTAH CODE ANN. is relevant 
to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Appellant, Wendalyn Ence, now known as Wendalyn Smith 
(and hereinafter referred to as "Wife") filed a Complaint on 
January 5, 1995 seeking a divorce from Husband, in Weber 
County District Court. A trial was held on September 8, 
1995, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, presiding. 
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As to the issue of alimony, the court ordered the Wife 
to pay the Husband $1,700.00 per month for a period of 21 
years. In addition, the court ordered the Wife to pay a 
portion of the Husband's attorney's fees incurred in this 
action. 
The Wife appealed and the Husband cross-appealed. This 
Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further 
findings on the issues of alimony and attorney fees. 
On remand, the trial court entered more findings of 
fact and conclusions of law specifically addressing the 
issues of the Husband's financial need, his ability to earn, 
and the wife's ability to provide support. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact were 
entered on September 24, 1998. This Decree awarded Husband 
alimony of $1,500.00 per month for 4 years and $800.00 per 
month thereafter for 17 years. In addition, the trial court 
again awarded the Husband a portion of his attorney's fees 
incurred herein. 
From this Amended Decree, the Wife has appealed. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on November 25, 1974. (ROA 
425). At the time of the marriage, the Wife was 21 years of 
3 
age and the Husband was 35 years of age. (ROA 425). At the 
time of trial, the parties had been married for 21 years and 
had two children, both of whom had reached their majority. 
(ROA 425). At the time of trial, Husband was 56 years of 
age and Wife was 42 years of age. (ROA 256). 
Throughout the parties' marriage, the Husband worked 
full-time as a heavy equipment operator, and has worked in 
the field since 1956. (ROA 257). He has no college 
training and he has graduated from high school. (ROA 256). 
Husband earned approximately $18.52 per hour during the time 
the Wife was in medical school. (ROA 266). The company 
Husband worked for was purchased by another company while 
Wife was in medical school and his wage dropped to $14.50 
per hour. (ROA 268). After six months this was raised to 
$15.00 per hour. (ROA 270). 
When the parties married, the Wife worked as a 
secretary in a hospital. (ROA 143). During the marriage 
when the parties' children were young, the Wife was the 
primary caregiver and worked part-time at home as a typist 
for the local airport. (ROA 144). In January of 1981, the 
Wife entered college at Glendale Community College. (ROA 
145). She transferred to Grand Canyon University in 1983. 
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(ROA 145). She obtained her undergraduate degree 1985. 
(ROA 146). 
Throughout her four years of undergraduate education, 
the Wife borrowed approximately $6,000.00 for tuition and 
received some scholarships. (ROA 148). Throughout all of 
this time the Husband supported the family through his full-
time employment as a heavy equipment operator. (ROA 257). 
For the two years after graduating from college, the 
Wife worked as an estimator for an industrial truss company 
and as a substitute teacher. (ROA 150). The Wife earned 
approximately $15,000.00 per year during this time. (ROA 
151). For these two years the Husband supported the family 
through his full-time employment. (ROA 257). 
The Wife applied for and was accepted to medical school 
in 1987. (ROA 152). The Wife and the parties' children 
moved to Tucson for the Wife to attend medical school at the 
University of Arizona. (ROA 153). In order to facilitate 
this move and the Wife's desire to go to medical school, the 
parties purchased a home in Tucson in 1987. (ROA 152-153). 
During this time, as stated above, the Husband was 
supporting the family with his full-time employment which 
allowed the Wife and the parties' children to move to Tucson 
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and the Wife to attend medical school. (ROA 257 ROA 155). 
During these four years, the Husband had to live apart 
from Wife and his children in order to keep his job and 
support his family and Wife's decision to attend medical 
school. (ROA 140-41). The parties sold their trailer home 
and purchased a home in Tucson, while Husband stayed in 
Phoenix during the work week and lived in a 1965 19 foot 
camp trailer and spent the weekends in Tucson. (ROA 264-
65). During the four years that the Wife was in medical 
school, Husband worked 40 hours a week, as well as "a lot of 
overtime." (ROA 267). Husband tried to find a job in 
Tucson so that he could be with his family more, but with 
Wife in medical school, the children to support, and the 
house in Tucson, it was not financially feasible for Husband 
to take a lower paying job in Tucson. (ROA 268). 
During medical school, the Wife incurred approximately 
$49,000.00 in student loans. (ROA 155). Approximately 
$23,000.00 of this amount went to tuition, books, and other 
educational expenses. (ROA 155). The remaining $26,000.00 
assisted with household expenses over her four years in 
medical school, or $6,500.00 per year. (ROA 155). During 
her third and fourth years of medical school, Wife "hired" a 
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first year medical student to act as a nanny. (ROA 205). 
In exchange for room and board living in the Tucson home, 
this nanny cooked for the parties' children, made sure they 
got to bed, helped them with their homework, and got them 
off to school in the morning. (ROA 205). In addition, 
during the Wife's four years of medical school, the parties' 
savings of approximately $10,000.00 were spent. (ROA 239 
ROA 254). 
Wife graduated from medical school in May of 1991. 
(ROA 163). The family moved to Ogden, Utah in June of 1991 
to allow the Wife to complete her internship and residency 
requirements at McKay Dee Hospital. (ROA 163). Wife 
completed her internship and residency in June of 1994. 
(ROA 164). 
When the parties moved to Ogden, Husband was 52 years 
of age and had trouble finding employment. (ROA 271). 
There were very few union jobs in Utah and $10.00 per hour 
was the top wage. (ROA 272). After discussing the 
situation, the parties decided that Husband should stay home 
with the parties' children and take care of the house. (ROA 
274) . 
During 1994, the last full year of the parties' 
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marriage, the Wife earned $106,381.00. (ROA 171). After 
the parties' separation, Husband found work in St. George, 
Utah, and was paid $12.00 per hour at the time of trial. 
(ROA 172-173). At the time of trial, Wife was making 
$120,000.00 per year. (ROA 199). In addition to this 
salary, under her employment contract, the hospital paid 
other expenses for the wife as well, including $1,600.00 per 
month to pay back her student loans in full, paying for her 
malpractice insurance, paying for her continuing education, 
and her overhead. (ROA 199-200). 
On November 12, 1995, the trial court entered a Decree 
of Divorce, and, in relevant part, ordered Wife to pay 
Husband $1,700.00 per month for alimony for 21 years, and 
ordered Wife to pay a portion of Husband's attorney's fees. 
(ROA 108). Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12, 
1995. (ROA 116). This Court entered a Memorandum Decision 
on November 7, 1996, case #950829 CA, reversing and 
remanding the issues of attorneys fees and alimony for 
further factual findings. (ROA 375-76). The trial court 
entered subsequent findings on remand, and specifically 
awarded Husband alimony of $1,500.00 per month for the first 
four years, and $800.00 per month for 17 more years. (ROA 
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425-35) . On September 16, 1997, the trial court filed its 
Findings of Fact and Order which supplemented its findings 
with regards to the award of a portion of Husband's 
attorney's fees. (ROA 435 these findings are attached as 
Addendum A to this brief). 
Wife filed her Notice of Appeal on October 22, 1998. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Wife's attack on the trial court's findings must fail 
for two reasons. First, Wife has failed to marshal all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
that, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the findings. Wife simply ignores the evidence in support 
of the findings and reargues the facts which were already 
considered and weighed at the trial level. 
Second, Wife is precluded from challenging the findings 
of the trial court as she drafted the findings which were 
adopted by the trial court and has not alleged any fraud on 
the trial court. Wife now argues facts which were already 
argued at trial and not included in the findings which she 
drafted. Therefore, Wife has effectively waived any 
objection to the findings, and such a waiver is conclusive 
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on appeal. 
The trial court's award of alimony, in duration and 
amount, is within the trial court's broad discretion under 
both theories which the trial court clearly addressed in its 
Findings of Fact and Order. (ROA 425, Addendum "A"). The 
first theory the trial court employed was to use alimony to 
maintain the Husband, as closely as possible, at a 
reasonable standard of living. The trial court specifically 
addressed the Husband's needs and standard of living during 
the marriage, his ability to provide income, and the Wife's 
ability to provide support. 
The second theory the trial court employed was to award 
Husband a compensating adjustment of alimony (1) because the 
parties had a marriage of long duration which dissolved on 
the threshold of a major change in income of the Wife due to 
the collective efforts of both spouses, and (2) because the 
trial court found that Wife's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during 
the marriage. 
Finally, Husband is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. The trial court specifically 
addressed the reasonableness of his attorney's fees, his 
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ability to pay them, and Wife's ability to assist in paying 
Husband's fees. The trial court awarded Husband attorney's 
fees at the trial court and such an award is appropriate on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WIFE'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REQUIRE THAT THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT BE ACCEPTED. 
"To overturn a trial court's finding of fact, ^an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the 
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings/' Bailey-
Allen, 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Coalville 
City v. Lundgreen, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. 
1997)(quoting Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1989)), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997). Two of the 
issues which the Wife has raised in her Brief attack the 
trial court's findings. Specifically, the Wife has brought 
the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err when it based its alimony 
award from inferred facts and from income earned during only 
one year of a twenty-one year marriage? 
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2. Did the trial court err in finding that Husband is 
unable to earn more than $12.00 per hour? 
However, the Wife has failed to marshal any evidence in 
support of the lower court's findings as to these issues. 
Further, the Wife has mischaracterized the trial court's 
findings and the facts on which the trial court relied. 
The trial court did not simply pick one year out of the 
parties' 21 year marriage arbitrarily to establish a 
standard of living. The trial court generally discussed the 
income of the family and the Husband's earnings from 1956 
forward. (ROA 426). The trial court also considered the 
contributions made by the Wife's part-time and full-time 
employment, as well as her contributions to the family 
expenses made through her student loans. (ROA 426). The 
trial court specifically found the income history of the 
family to be $51,000 in 1987 (ROA 428) the year the Wife 
entered medical school. During the four years the Wife was 
in medical school the trial court specifically found the 
family's income to be $41,000, $36,000, $36,000, and $30,000 
respectively (ROA 427). After medical school, when the 
Husband left his job in Arizona so that the Wife could 
finish her residency requirements in Utah, the family's 
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income was $34,000 in 1992, $57,000 in 1993, and $100,000 in 
1994. (ROA 428). However, the Wife has failed to marshal 
this evidence and has mischaracterized the trial court's 
findings by arguing that the "trial court erred when it 
based its alimony award from inferred facts and from income 
during only one year of a twenty-one year marriage." (Aplt. 
Brief p. 12). The trial court clearly considered the 
specific family earnings for the eight years listed, and 
generally considered Husband's earnings and employment since 
1956. 
The second issue the Wife has raised which attacks the 
trial court's findings concerns the Husband's earning 
potential. The Wife argues that "[t]he trial court erred in 
finding that husband's earning capacity was limited to 
$12.00 per hour." (Aplt. Brief p. 15). The Wife 
acknowledges that the trial court found that the Husband: 
(1) was 56 years of age at the time of trial; (2) had worked 
as a heavy equipment operator since 1956; (3) had no formal 
education beyond high school; and (4) was earning $12.00 per 
hour at the time of trial working as a heavy equipment 
operator in St. George, Utah. (Aplt. Brief p. 15,16). 
While this evidence is sufficient to support the trial 
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court's findings, more evidence was available which the Wife 
neglected to marshal. 
The Wife argues that the trial court found that the 
although the Husband was earning $12.00 per hour in Utah, 
"he would have been earning $15.00 per hour if he had not 
moved to Utah from Arizona. . . . [t]here is no explanation 
for this discrepancy." (Aplt. Brief p. 15). However, there 
is an explanation clearly explained by the trial court. The 
trial court found that the Husband "testified without 
rebuttal that because Utah is a non-union state, the top 
wage available in 1991 for a heavy equipment operator was 
$10.00 per hour" and that in 1995, "at the time trial [he] 
was earning $12.00 per hour . . . as a heavy equipment 
operator . . . in St. George, Utah." (ROA 429). 
Therefore, the court's justification for using the 
lower hourly wage was due to the unrebutted fact that, 
because Utah is a non-union state, the Husband could not 
earn as much here as elsewhere. The court also clearly 
found that this move to Utah, and the subsequent decrease in 
the Husband's earning capacity, was not made by the 
Husband's choice. The move was made to forward the Wife's 
medical career. "[The Wife] graduated from medical school 
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in May 1991 and the parties moved to Ogden, Utah to allow 
[the Wife] to complete her internship and residency 
requirements at McKay Dee Hospital/' (ROA 427). These 
facts were not marshaled in by Wife in support of the trial 
court's findings. 
Rather than marshaling the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrating that, even if 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, 
the Wife attempts to offer pure speculation and conjecture 
to attack the trial court's findings. The Wife argues that 
"there is no reason to believe husband will stay in Utah and 
continue to work for lower pay . . . [i]t appears more 
likely that he will follow the construction booms in other 
nearby states." (Aplt. Brief p. 15). This statement is 
made without cite or evidentiary support and has no basis in 
the record. In fact the trial court found that "[w]hen the 
parties separated [the Husband] returned to Arizona to look 
for union employment similar to that he gave up to move to 
Utah but was unable to find any/' (ROA 429, emphasis 
added). Also, Husband will be of retirement age in very few 
years. It is just as logical to assume that he cannot work 
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or is the victim of age discrimination in hiring, as to 
assume he will move to follow "booms/' 
Due to Wife's complete lack of marshaling the evidence, 
Wife has failed to demonstrate that, if the evidence 
supporting the lower court's findings is viewed in a light 
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is in any 
way legally insufficient to support the findings. 
Therefore, the findings of fact must be accepted by this 
court. Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186. 
II. WIFE IS PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE FINDINGS ABSENT 
ALLEGED FRAUD ON THE COURT. 
Wife drafted the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were adopted by the trial court. 
(ROA 397, Aplt. Addendum). Wife's Appellate Brief then 
attacks these findings and asserts material allegations of 
fact which were already raised at trial. 
"When, however, a party drafts findings which are 
adopted by the court, and includes therein no 
mention of a material allegation of fact raised at 
trial, such party may be deemed to have waived any 
objection to the failure of the trial court to 
make such a finding. Such a waiver must be 
considered conclusive upon appeal. To rule 
otherwise would permit a party tacitly to omit a 
material finding of fact from the proposed 
findings, and then pursue reversal as a matter of 
law due to failure of the trial court to make such 
a finding." Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931, 935 
(Utah 1979)(emphasis added) (citing Farrell v. 
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Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah 1971). 
Wife has not alleged any fraud on the trial court. Wife is 
simply trying to argue the same facts as were argued and 
considered at trial because she is not satisfied with the 
trial court's decision. Therefore, Wife is precluded from 
challenging the findings of the trial court. See Howard, 
601 P.2d at 934 (holding that plaintiff was precluded from 
challenging the findings of the trial court where plaintiff 
drafted the findings which were adopted by the trial court 
and did not allege a fraud on the court). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD TO HUSBAND WAS CLEARLY 
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION. 
A trial court must consider three factors in setting a 
reasonable award of alimony: 1) the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for himself; 
and 3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 
1988)(citing Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 
1987)); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see 
also §30-3-5 (7) (a) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998). 
"If these three factors have been considered, we will 
not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a 
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serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion. Schindler, 776 P.2d at 90 (citing Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 950 (Utah App. 1988); Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1988)). "The 
ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the party 
receiving alimony will be able to support him or herself *as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed 
during the marriage."' Id. (quoting English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). "In formulating alimony awards, 
the trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions will 
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest 
injustice." Watson, 837 P.2d at 3. 
In addition to the goal of maintaining parties as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage, Utah has also recognized the employment of an 
alimony award as "compensating adjustment" where a marriage 
of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the parties due to the 
collective efforts of both. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 
538, 542 (Utah 1991); §30-3-5(7)(e) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998). 
The trial court's findings clearly support the alimony 
award under each of these theories. 
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A. The Trial Court's Award of Alimony to Husband Was 
Within Its Discretion as the Trial Court 
Considered All Three of the Factors to Maintain 
Husband at the Standard of Living Enjoyed During 
the Marriage. 
As stated above, a trial court must consider three 
factors in setting a reasonable award of alimony: 1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient 
income for himself; and 3) the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124 
(citations omitted). The trial court made specific and 
detailed findings on each of these three issues in awarding 
alimony to the Husband in the amount of $1,500 per month for 
four years and $800 per month for seventeen years 
thereafter. 
First, the trial court carefully made findings as to 
the family's income and earnings with general findings from 
1956 through 1987 and exact findings from 1987 through 1994, 
the last full year of the parties' marriage. (ROA 426-428). 
Specifically, the trial court found that the annual family 
income fluctuated from $30,000 to $100,000 during the 
marriage. (ROA 427-428). The trial court discussed the 
duties and contributions of both of the parties from 1956 
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through 1994. (ROA 426-427). The trial court made findings 
as to the family's living arrangements and housing. (ROA 
427). The family had little to no savings, and therefore it 
is clear 'that their entire income went to finance their 
standard of living. In fact, while in Tucson, the parties 
were subsidized by student loans to support their standard 
of living as well as by Husband's income. (These loans were 
repaid by Wife's first employer after medical school). 
The trial court used $51,000 as a "fair benchmark" as 
the "general standard of living enjoyed by the parties 
during the marriage." (ROA 428). At the time of trial, the 
Husband earned $12.00 per hour, or $2,080 gross per month. 
This amounts to $24,960 gross per year. With $1,500 per 
month is alimony, the Husband would have $42,960 to attempt 
to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage for the first four years. After these four years, 
Husband would be approximately 60 years of age, and if he 
can continue to work at $12.00 per hour, with $800 per month 
in alimony, he will have $34,560 to maintain the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage. Surely, the $51,000 
figure employed by the court was within the court's 
discretion as the family income was $57,000 in 1993 and 
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$100,000 in 1994, the two years of the marriage closest to 
the trial date. During the years that the family earned 
less, the Wife was not contributing any income to the 
family,1 or the Husband was unable to find work after the 
family's relocation to Ogden, which was made to facilitate 
the Wife's completion of her residency requirements. 
Second, the trial court specifically addressed the 
Husband's "earning capacity or ability to produce income/' 
(ROA 428-430) . The trial court found that the Husband was 
56 years of age, only had work experience as a heavy 
equipment operator, and had no formal education beyond high 
school. (ROA 428). The trial court specifically found that 
Husband had sacrificed a higher paying job in Arizona to 
facilitate Wife's medical career by moving to Utah, a non-
union state, where his earning capacity was 20% lower than 
Arizona. (ROA 429). The trial court specifically found 
that, after the parties had separated, the higher paying 
work in Arizona was no longer available, and that Husband 
was earning $12.00 per hour in St. George, Utah. (ROA 429). 
These findings clearly support the trial court's 
1
 However, approximately $6,500 of the Wife's student 
loans per year were used to supplement to Husband paying all 
of the family expenses. 
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finding that, at the time of trial, Husband's "age and 
skills limit him to a position as a heavy equipment operator 
and make him unable to produce income greater than $12.00 
per hour." (ROA 429). If Husband's earning capacity 
changes in the future, Wife can always petition to modify 
the alimony award as allowed under existing Utah law. 
Third, the trial court specifically addressed the 
Wife's ability to provide support. (ROA 430). The trial 
court found that, under the Wife's employment contract at 
the time of trial, she earned $120,000 per year, or $10,000 
per month gross and $7,000 per month net. (ROA 430). In 
addition to this substantial income, the hospital also paid 
her overhead, her continuing medical education, her 
malpractice insurance, and her student loan payments. (ROA 
199-200) . The court specifically found that the Wife had 
reasonable monthly expenses of $4,104, leaving $2,896 per 
month out of her net income beyond her expenses to help the 
Husband maintain a reasonable standard of living. (ROA 
430) . 
As the trial court specifically addressed each of the 
three factors required under Utah law to set an alimony 
award that will maintain the Husband, as nearly as possible, 
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at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the 
trial court's award of alimony was within its broad 
discretion. See Watson, 837 P.2d at 3; Schindler, 776 P.2d 
at 90; Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 950; Andersen, 757 P.2d at 478. 
B. The Trial Court's Award of Alimony to Husband Was 
Within Its Discretion as a Compensating 
Adjustment. 
"When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one 
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing 
the marital property and in determining the amount 
of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony/' §30-3-5 (7) (e) UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1998) . 
This statute was enacted after the Martinez case. In 
Martinez, the parties were married for 17 years, during 
which time the husband went to medical school, against the 
wishes of the wife. 818 P.2d at 539. The wife "did not 
contribute financially to her husband's medical education." 
Id. However, the trial court found that the wife "made 
substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate the completion 
of [the husband's] medical schooling and internship/' Id. 
In discussing the alimony issue, the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that: 
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When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one 
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change, should be given some weight in 
fashioning the support award . . . [t]hus, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the 
trial court to make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing marital property and awarding alimony/' 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In the current case, the trial court found that "the 
parties had a marriage of long duration — 21 years — and 
that it dissolved on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of the [Wife] due to the collective efforts of both 
spouses." (ROA 431). This finding required that the trial 
court consider this change in determining the amount of 
alimony. The code orders that upon such a finding the trial 
court "shall" consider this change in awarding alimony. The 
trial court did not have any discretion to not consider this 
change as it would have been legal error to ignore this 
change upon the findings. 
The trial court also found that the Wife's "earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of 
both spouses during the marriage." (ROA 431). Upon making 
this finding, the code allows the trial court the discretion 
to make a compensating adjustment in awarding alimony. 
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The trial court specifically found that the Husband 
"provided the infrastructure that supported the [Wife] in 
her accustomed lifestyle while she attended school/' (ROA 
431). The trial court found that the Husband paid for the 
bulk of the family expenses during the marriage, including 
the purchase of the house in Tucson which was bought so that 
Wife could attend medical school there. (ROA 431). The 
Husband's efforts allowed the Wife to hire a nanny while in 
her last two years in medical school so that she could focus 
on her medical training. (ROA 431). The trial court found 
that the employment of the nanny "allowed [Wife] to spend 
increased time at the school and the hospital, [and] was 
made possible by the home financed by [Husband's] salary." 
(ROA 431). 
The trial court further found that while Wife and the 
children lived in Tucson so that Wife could attend medical 
school, Husband remained in Phoenix so that he could keep 
his job and support the family and Wife's education. (ROA 
432). During this time, because the Husband was paying the 
mortgage on the house in Tucson, he lived in a travel 
trailer in Phoenix on his parents' property and traveled an 
average of 240 miles each weekend to Tucson to visit Wife 
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and the children. (ROA 432). 
In spite of these clear findings, Wife argues that 
"there is no evidence that husband was disadvantaged 
economically in any way . . . [h]e made no personal 
sacrifices that resulted in a reduced standard of living 
because he did not suffer a loss of income." (Aplt. Brief 
p. 19). The trial court clearly found that Husband lived in 
a travel trailer in order to keep his job so that he could 
afford to buy a house in Tucson so that Wife could attend 
medical school. This is one sacrifice Husband made to 
enhance the Wife's earning potential at his expense. 
Husband almost completely supported Wife while she was in 
school. Husband's sacrifices allowed Wife to hire a nanny 
so that she could spend more time at the medical school and 
in the hospital to enhance her career. Husband left his job 
in Arizona to move with the family to Ogden, Utah to 
facilitate the Wife's finishing of her residency 
requirements. This move caused Husband to lose his job and 
move to a non-union state where wages for the type of job he 
was qualified for were" much lower. After the separation, 
Husband tried to get his job in Arizona back, but it was not 
available so he had to take a 20% wage decrease working in 
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St. George, Utah. 
Surely these qualify as both economic sacrifices and 
the sacrifices of living apart from his family and solely 
supporting his family, which have greatly enhanced Wife's 
earning potential. Prior to Husband making these sacrifices 
to facilitate Wife's education she earned no more than 
$15,000 in a year. In the last year of the marriage, she 
earned $100,000. The year of trial she earned $120,000 
along with many other aforementioned benefits. This amounts 
to an enhanced earning of 666% and 800% respectively.2 It 
is obvious that Wife's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced by the efforts of both spouses during the marriage 
and a compensating award is appropriate under these 
circumstances. 
Wife argues that Husband is not entitled to a 
compensating award of alimony because his "contributions to 
the support of the family while wife attended medical school 
was the same support contributions he made willingly when 
the wife stayed home and took care of the children." (Aplt. 
Brief p. 20). While irrelevant, this statement is also a 
misrepresentation of the facts. 
2
 $100,000/$15,000 = 666% and $120,000/$15,000 = 800%. 
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Prior to the Wife's entering medical school, the family 
did not live separate requiring the Husband, as the primary 
wage earner to support two households. This sacrifice was 
made only to facilitate the Wife's attendance at medical 
school in Tucson. Prior to the Wife's entering medical 
school, the family never needed to employ a nanny. This 
employment was made possible through Husband's paying the 
mortgage on the house in Tucson, although he only was able 
to stay there on weekends. Prior to Wife's entering medical 
school, Husband was able to live with his family, but due to 
the Wife's need to live in Tucson and the family's need for 
the Husband to continue to solely support them with his job 
in Phoenix, Husband had to drive 240 miles each weekend to 
see his family. Prior to the Wife's entering medical 
school, the family lived in Arizona, a union state, where 
Husband was able to earn, in 1990, 125% of what he can earn 
currently in Utah. He had to give up his job and seniority 
in Arizona to facilitate Wife's medical career. 
If this Court accepts Wife's theory of a compensating 
adjustment to alimony, a spouse who has always supported 
his/her family could never receive a compensating award 
because this would be the same support the earning spouse 
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had always provided. This would render §30-3-5(7)(e) 
useless. Wife's theory is against the clear language of the 
code and case law and would provide unjust and unfair 
results to spouses in Husband's situation who made great 
sacrifices to facilitate Wife attaining her medical degree, 
only to be divorced immediately after she finished her 
residency. 
Wife also argues that a compensating or reimbursement 
type of award of alimony should only be considered "where 
the supporting spouse becomes economically disadvantaged in 
a virtually absolute sense in that they were unable to earn 
a living either at all or above minimum wage." (Aplt. Brief 
10). This argument has absolutely no basis in the code or 
case law. Utah has never required a finding that the 
recipient spouse be "economically disadvantaged in a 
virtually absolute sense" or be "unable to earn a living 
either at all or above minimum wage" in order to be awarded 
a compensating award of alimony. Such a requirement would 
be completely contrary to all Utah law which states that 
alimony should be employed to: (1) keep the parties, as near 
as possible, at the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage; (2) equalize the parties' respective standards of 
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living; or (3) to compensate or reimburse a spouse, after a 
marriage of long duration, when the marriage dissolves on 
the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both. See §30-3-
5(7); Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121; Eames, 735 P.2d 395; 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072; Martinez, 818 P.2d 538; Schindler, 776 
P.2d 84; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993); 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1. Nowhere in Utah law is a finding of 
poverty required under any of the theories of alimony in 
Utah, and such a requirement would be contrary to all Utah 
law and public policy. 
This was a 21 year marriage where the Husband made 
numerous and substantial sacrifices to enhance the Wife's 
career and earning capacity, including (1) providing nearly 
all of the support for the family during Wife's medical 
education, prior to which she was employed, at least part-
time; (2) living apart from his family so that he could keep 
his job to support Wife's move to Tucson for her education 
and driving 240 miles each weekend to be with his family all 
he could; (3) providing the means for Wife to hire a nanny 
to take care of the kids and the house while in her last two 
years of medical school; and (4) sacrificing his job in 
30 
Arizona and accepting a 20% pay decrease in Utah to 
facilitate the Wife finishing her residency and internship 
requirements in Utah. These sacrifices allowed Wife to 
enhance her earning capacity 800%. On the threshold of this 
major change in her earning capacity, the marriage 
dissolved. Therefore, the trial court was clearly within 
its discretion in awarding a compensating adjustment of 
alimony to Husband in an amount "necessary both to restore 
[Husband] to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
parties' marriage, and to compensate [Husband] for his 
contribution to [Wife's] increased earning capacity." (ROA 
434) . 
C. The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion In 
Awarding Husband Alimony For 21 Years. 
The Wife also argues that xx[t]he trial court erred in 
awarding alimony for twenty-one years." (Aplt Brief p. 16). 
However, this is not a question of legal error, an award of 
alimony, including the duration, by a trial court is 
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075 (holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering temporary alimony); Andersen, 757 
P.2d at 479 (holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering that alimony terminate upon the 
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completion of schooling without requiring a showing a 
material change in financial circumstances). 
The Utah Code requires that the trial court consider 
the length of the marriage in determining alimony. §30-3-
5(7)(a)(iv) UTAH CODE ANN. The trial court found that the 
parties had been married for 21 years at the time of trial. 
(ROA 425). The trial court ordered alimony to continue for 
21 years. (ROA 436). The trial court made specific 
findings as to Husband's income potential and prospective 
retirement income. (ROA 430). In addition, the trial court 
found that Husband's expenses would remain relatively 
constant and that "in order to keep [Husband] at an 
appropriate standard of living it is necessary to continue 
alimony past the point of [Husband's] retirement . . . [and] 
that alimony should continue for 21 years, or the length of 
the parties' marriage/' (ROA 430) . 
As the trial court clearly considered the financial 
condition of Husband, his standard of living, the length of 
the parties' marriage, and Husband's possible retirement 
income, it is obvious that the trial court's award of 
alimony for 21 years was within the trial court's 
discretion. 
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IV. HUSBAND SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
"^Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded 
below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal.'" Watson, 837 P.2d 
at 8 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990)). Husband was awarded attorney's fees in the lower 
court after a careful analysis of the reasonableness of the 
fees, the Husband's ability to pay said fees, and the Wife's 
financial ability to contribute to the Husband's attorney's 
fees. (ROA 435); see Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 
1336 (Utah App. 1988); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980); 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah App. 1989). 
Therefore, Husband should be awarded his attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Husband greatly assisted the Wife in attaining her 
medical degree and enhancing her medical career through 
financial support, sacrificing time with his family, 
sacrificing his job in Arizona, and contributing all the 
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intangible emotional support which is needed when a spouse 
attends a challenging professional school and engages in a 
demanding career. Almost immediately after Wife had 
completed her residency requirements, the marriage was 
dissolved. Husband is now almost 60, has work experience 
only with heavy construction equipment, and has a high 
school education. 
The alimony award of $1,500 per month for four years 
and $800 per month for seventeen years thereafter is clearly 
appropriate as it is only a small fraction of Wife's 
earnings at the time of the trial, which earnings were made 
possible by both parties' contributions, and "is necessary 
both to restore [Husband] to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the parties' marriage, and to compensate [Husband] 
for his contribution to [Wife's] increased earning 
capacity." (ROA 434). 
For the foregoing reasons, Husband requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's award of alimony, in amount 
and duration, and award him his attorney's fees and costs 
incurred pursuant to this appeal. 
34 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June, 1999. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WE3ER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDALYN ENCE nka WENDALYN 
SMITH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
LARRY D. ENCE, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
p~. 
• * 
Case No. 954900029~ 
This matter is before the court on remand from the Coifrt of*-
Appeals to make additional findings to support the alimony award 
and to reassess the award based on the additional findings. The 
court is also directed to redetermine the attorney fees award based 
on additional findings. This court apologizes to the parties and 
the appellate court for the inadequate findings. The court makes 
the following findings of fact: 
I. ALIMONY 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 25, 1974; 
plaintiff was 21 years of age and defendant was 35 years of age. At 
the time of trial they had been married 21 years. The parties have 
two children who have reached majority. 
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A. The financial condition and needs of the defendant: 
2. The court was not provided with a list of defendant's current 
monthly expenses and so must therefore infer defendant's needs from 
the limited evidence provided and from the standard of living 
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. 
3. Since 1956, and throughout the parties' marriage, defendant 
has been employed full time as a heavy equipment operator. Although 
his salary fluctuated, defendant earned as much as $18.52 per hour 
during the parties' marriage. Plaintiff supplemented the family 
income in secretarial positions prior to entering school full time. 
While the parties' children were young, plaintiff was the primary 
care giver and also worked part time at home as a typist. 
4. In January 1981 plaintiff entered college at Glendale 
Community College, later transferring to Grand Canyon University. 
After her first semester of college plaintiff did not work outside 
of the home until she graduated with her undergraduate degree in 
May of 1985. Plaintiff's undergraduate education was financed 
through two loans, totaling $6,000, and some scholarships. 
Plaintiff paid off the loans in December 1991 with post-residency 
earnings. 
5. From 1985 to 1987, plaintiff worked as an estimator for an 
industrial truss company and as a substitute teacher. She earned 
approximately $15,000 per year. In 1987 the parties earned $51,000 
jointly. 
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6. The parties lived in a mobile home until they purchased a 
small home when their children were young. When the parties moved 
to Phoenix, Arizona in 1980, they sold that home for approximately 
$32,000 and purchased a single 14 x 70 mobile home. They lived 
together in the mobile home until the plaintiff moved with the 
children to Tucson, Arizona, in 1987 to attend medical school. 
7. Plaintiff was accepted into medical school at the University 
of Arizona in Tucson in 1987. The parties purchased a home in 
Tucson and plaintiff moved there with the two children. During the 
week defendant stayed in a travel trailer in Phoenix and traveled 
home on the weekends, 
8. Plaintiff borrowed approximately $49,000 in student loans to 
finance her medical education, and contributed an average of $6,500 
per year from the loans to meet family expenses. The majority of 
family expenses were paid by the defendant's earnings, which were 
approximately $18.52 per hour when plaintiff began medical school 
and were $15.00 per hour when plaintiff graduated and the parties 
moved to Ogden. The income history of the family during plaintiff's 
time in medical school is as follows: $41,000 in 1988, $36,000 in 
1989, $36,000 in 1990, and $30,000 in 1991. 
9. Plaintiff graduated from medical school in May 1991 and the 
parties moved to Ogden, Utah to allow plaintiff to complete her 
internship and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital. The 
parties rented a home in Ogden for $745.00 per month. Defendant was 
unable to find suitable employment in Utah and he then remained 
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home to care for their teenage children. The parties earned $34,000 
in 1992, $57,000 in 1993, and $100,000 in 1994. 
10. Until the parties' 1994 vacation in Alaska, vacations were 
infrequent and were spent visiting relatives. They purchased 
moderately priced cars and did not buy expensive clothing. The 
parties' major asset at the time of trial was their home in Tucson. 
11. At the time of trial plaintiff was living in the rented four-
bedroom Ogden home, and defendant was renting a camp trailer from 
a cousin in St. George, Utah, for $500 per month. Although 
defendant argued he was unable to move into an apartment on his 
current income, the court questioned that assertion. 
12. During their marriage, with the exception of 1994, the last 
year of their marriage, the parties lived within a modest family 
income. Specifically, the court finds that the parties enjoyed as 
of 1987 a standard of living available to a family of four on 
approximately $51,000 per year of gross income. This court finds 
that the family income and standard of living existing in 1987 is 
a fair benchmark of the general standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties during the marriage and accordingly, an award of alimony 
should allow defendant to sustain a comparable standard of living. 
B. Defendant's earning capacity or ability to produce income: 
13. Defendant was 56 years old at the time of trial. He has worked 
as a heavy equipment operator since 1956. He has no formal 
education beyond high school. 
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14. When the parties separated defendant returned to Arizona to 
look for union employment similar to that he gave up to move to 
Utah but was unable to find any. He testified without rebuttal that 
because Utah is a non-union state, the top wage available in 1991 
for a heavy equipment operator was $10.00 per hour. At the time of 
trial defendant was earning $12.00 per hour, or $2,080 gross and 
$1,600 net per year, as a heavy equipment operator for Delray 
Jackson Construction in St. George, Utah. 
15. The court finds that defendant's age and skills limit him to 
a position as a heavy equipment operator and make him unable to 
produce income greater than $12.00 per hour. 
16. When the parties moved to Ogden to allow plaintiff to complete 
her internship and residency requirements, defendant gave up his 
union position in Arizona, where he was making $15.00 per hour. The 
court finds that, but for the parties' move to Utah, defendant 
would be earning between $15 per hour, or $2600 per month, and $17 
per hour, or $2947 per month.1 He is now earning $12 per hour, or 
$2080 per month. 
17. Defendant's retirement benefits had vested at the time of 
trial. If defendant retired at the time of trial, at 56 years of 
Although defendant testified that his salary in Arizona was 
going to stay at $15 per hour, the court believes his pay would 
have been raised periodically to keep pace with inflation. 
Accordingly, based on defendant's testimony that pay in Utah for a 
comparable job rose from $10 per hour when he first arrived to $12 
per hour at the time of trial, the court sets the range of 
defendant's possible salary in Arizona at $15 per hour to $17 per 
hour. 
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age (without adjustment for the Woodward share reduction), he would 
be eligible to receive $326.50 per month in benefits for the rest 
of his life. If he waited until he was 62 years of age to retire, 
he would collect $466.50 per month in retirement benefits. At trial 
plaintiff was awarded a Woodward share of defendant's retirement. 
18. The court anticipates that defendant's monthly expenses will 
remain relatively constant even after his retirement, in order to 
keep defendant at an appropriate standard of living it is necessary 
to continue alimony past the point of defendant's retirement. This 
court finds that alimony should continue for 21 years, or the 
length of the parties' marriage. 
C. Plaintiff's ability to provide support: 
19. At the time of trial plaintiff had a contract with the Medical 
Arts Clinic in Brigham City, Utah, for employment through August 
1997. Plaintiff was unsure of her employment after that time. Under 
her contract, plaintiff earned $120,000 per year, or $10,000 per 
month gross and $7,000 per month net. In addition to her salary, 
the hospital pays plaintiff's overhead expenses, her continuing 
medical education expenses, and her malpractice insurance. 
20. The court finds that plaintiff has reasonable monthly expenses 
of $4,104, which includes some of the expenses associated with 
caring for the parties' adult children. 
430 
Findings of Fact d Order 
Case No. 954900029 
Page 7 
D. Compensating Adjustment 
21. The court finds that the parties had a marriage of long 
duration—21 years—and that it dissolved on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of the plaintiff due to the collective 
efforts of both spouses. The court further finds that plaintiff's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of 
both spouses during the marriage. Although plaintiff clearly earned 
her medical degree through personal determination and sacrifice, 
defendant's efforts to assist her cannot be ignored. Specifically 
the court finds: 
a. Defendant provided the infrastructure that supported the 
plaintiff in her accustomed lifestyle while she attended 
school. Defendant's salary paid for the bulk of the household 
expenses, including the payment on the house in Tucson. In 
addition, during plaintiff's third and fourth years of medical 
school she was able to offer a first-year medical student a 
room in the parties' house in return for the student's 
services as a nanny. This arrangement, which allowed plaintiff 
to spend increased time at the school and the hospital, was 
made possible by the home financed by defendant's salary. 
b. Until entering school, plaintiff contributed to the 
family income through various full-time or part-time jobs. 
During the time plaintiff was in school she did not work, with 
the exception of the first semester of her undergraduate year. 
Prior to entering medical school, plaintiff contributed 
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$15,000 per year to meet the family expenses. While she was in 
medical school she contributed an average of $6,500 per year 
from her student loans to household expenses.2 Plaintiff 
therefore contributed less to the family income during her 
schooling than she had previously. 
c. While plaintiff was in medical school, plaintiff and the 
children lived in the family's home in Tucson and defendant 
lived in a travel trailer on his parent's property in Phoenix. 
Defendant traveled an average of 240 miles each weekend to 
visit the family. 
22. Plaintiff argues that the financial support defendant provided 
plaintiff simply met his statutory duty of support, and that 
plaintiff's educational accomplishments came as a result solely of 
her own increased efforts. Although the court recognizes that 
plaintiff's degree is a credit to her dedication and hard work, it 
cannot so easily categorize the support defendant provided her 
during her schooling. Plaintiff's approach does not take into 
account and value the intangible emotional support or encouragement 
provided to the plaintiff, or the sacrifices made by the defendant 
during this time. "The very idea of marriage contemplates mutual 
effort and mutual sacrifice.7' Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 
541 (Utah 1991). Plaintiff's education was a marital endeavor; the 
court cannot sort through each parties' contributions, separate 
2The $6,500 per year from the student loans was plaintiff's 
contribution to the family income because plaintiff paid off or 
will pay off the loans through her post-residency earnings. 
432 
Findings of Fact «Aid Order 
Case No. 954900029 
Page 9 
defendant's support, and dismiss it as not contributing to 
plaintiff's capacity to greatly enhance her income.3 
23. The court accordingly finds that plaintiff's earning capacity 
has been greatly enhanced due to the efforts of both spouses during 
the marriage and that a compensating adjustment is appropriate in 
this case. 
2. Equalization of Income 
24. Although the court recognizes that defendant contributed to 
plaintiff's increased earning capacity, the court finds that it is 
not appropriate to equalize the parties' income or standards of 
living. There is authority that "an alimony award should, to the 
extent possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce 
living standards," Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1980), however the court does not find that m this 
situation equalization is appropriate. The court believes that 
under these facts a better method of compensating defendant for his 
contribution to plaintiff's increased earning capacity is to 
provide reimbursement alimony. 
25. Equalization of the parties' standards of living is 
inappropriate first, because during the parties' marriage they did 
not enjoy the standard of living now attainable with plaintiff's 
3It is interesting to note that the flip side of this 
argument--that a wife who maintains a home has offered no more than 
her statutory services of support--has never been accepted by the 
courts. Utah courts have always valued each spouse's contribution, 
financial or otherwise, to marital endeavors. 
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increased earning capacity, and second, because defendant is able, 
with a limited alimony award, to support himself at the standard of 
living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. Compare 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) (finding 
equalization appropriate where wife could not support herself at 
the high standard of living the parties had enjoyed together); 
Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 n.4 (Utah App. 1987) 
(distinguishing its fact pattern from a situation where one party 
is on the verge of higher earning potential, where a more creative 
alimony award may be necessary to achieve fairness) . 
26. Further, although the court finds that the parties' joint 
efforts made plaintiff's education possible, the court emphasizes 
that clearly plaintiff's achievements are due in large part to her 
own extended efforts. 
27. The court finds that an award of reimbursement alimony will 
assist the defendant in establishing a level of housing and 
personal property ownership that will thereafter allow him, with an 
ongoing alimony award, to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed by the 
parties during the marriage. 
F. Award of Alimony 
28. In summary, the court finds that an award of alimony is 
necessary both to restore defendant to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the parties' marriage, and to compensate defendant 
for his contribution to plaintiff's increased earning capacity. 
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Defendant is therefore awarded $1500 per month for the first four 
years following the parties' divorce, and then $800 per month for 
17 more years. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
1. The court finds that the rate charged by defendant's attorney, 
Ms. Corporon, of $150.00 is reasonable considering her experience 
and is consistent with rates charged in the area for similar 
services. 
2. Defendant's attorney fees will total $3,000. The court finds 
this total amount to be reasonable considering the complexity of 
the case. 
3. Without consideration of the alimony award, defendant does not 
have the financial assets to pay his own attorney fees. He nets -
$1600 per month, and is without sufficient savings or assets to 
cover the expense. 
4. The court finds, however, that the defendant, with his initial 
alimony payments of $1500, has the necessary income to pay $2,000 
of his own attorney fees. 
5. Plaintiff, whose monthly income is approximately $7000 per 
month net, has the financial ability to pay her own attorney fees 
and to pay the remainder of defendant's attorney fees. 
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III. ORDER 
1. Defendant is hereby awarded alimony of $1500 per month for 
four years and then $800 per month for seventeen more years. 
2. Plaintiff shall pay $1,000 of defendant's attorney fees and 
shall be responsible for her own attorney fees. 
Counsel for the parties shall please prepare appropriate 
amended findings and a decree. 
Dated this /U day of September, 1997. 
Michael y Glasmann, Judge 
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